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The title of this essay is a transliteration of a rustic Hindi proverb that captures one of the truths of human existence in a way that only a proverb can. Taken literally, the proverb says that 'the one who owns the stick owns the buffalo'. Of course, proverbs are not meant to be taken literally—this particular proverb needs to be understood in the context of rural life in India where disagreements are all too often settled by rough and ready means. Seen from this perspective, the truer meaning of this proverb is that in this world of ours, 'the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept'. I have chosen this proverb as the title for this essay because it accurately describes what two intellectual heavyweights of the Hindu nationalist movement, Vinayak Savarkar and Madhav Golwalkar, take the nature of international politics to be. Unfortunately, I cannot take credit for this use of the proverb. I must admit to having borrowed it from Golwalkar, who tells the story of the eminent Indian barrister N. C. Chatterjee declaring the proverb the first principle of international law. Nonetheless, I hope to still earn some credit by explaining why it best describes the Hindu nationalist view of international politics.

Few subjects have occupied students of modern India in the way that Hindu nationalism has. One consequence of this has been a veritable avalanche of publications on the subject. Yet, it is notably the case that barely a handful of these have examined the Hindu nationalist view of international politics. This neglect can be attributed to two factors. The first is context. Over the past three decades, the instability and violence associated with the upsurge in Hindu nationalism have prompted scholars to focus on its implications for domestic politics. The recent spate of works on riots is a case in point. By contrast, the statements and actions of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the political wing of the Hindu nationalist movement, have not been seen as having introduced significant discontinuities in Indian foreign policy. Hence, there has been relatively little incentive to investigate the Hindu nationalist view of international politics.

The second factor is methodology. The bulk of the research on Hindu nationalism has been oriented toward explanation rather than interpretation. This has led to a wealth of scholarship on the extent to which the development and contemporary appeal of Hindu nationalism can be attributed to, among other things, colonial history, the unsuitability of the concept of secularism in the Indian context, organisational features and political tactics of Hindu nationalist groups, the policies of the Congress Party, and hostility toward democracy and Westernisation. But, it has also resulted in

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3 For example, see Steven L. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).


5 For example see, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986); Rajeev Bhargava, ed., Secularism and Its Critics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); Amrita Basu, ‘Mass Movement or Elite Conspiracy: The Puzzle
a paucity of studies on the foundational texts of Hindu nationalist thought.\(^6\)

I noted above that a few publications have in fact discussed the Hindu nationalist view of international politics. Unfortunately, they have cast a very uneven light on the subject. To begin, only one of these, Kanti Bajpai’s path-breaking essay on Indian strategic thought, has closely examined the relevant texts.\(^7\) Then there is the broader problem that these publications have tended to interpret Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s writings on international politics as little more than expressions of an irrationally assertive nationalism. Bajpai, for example, asserts that the Hindu nationalist view of international relations draws on a ‘narrative about the past, present, and future of the Hindu community’ that has produced a ‘hard-bitten’ ethics.\(^8\) This can be seen, for example, in contrasting attitudes toward nuclear weapons, which ‘are seen by many Westerners as a tragic necessity’, whereas ‘political Hinduism embraces them’.\(^9\) This leads him to the conclusion that Hindu nationalism’s ‘stance on international relations and the use of violence is not a particularly prudential one’.\(^10\)

In my view, this interpretation misidentifies what is truly distinctive about the Hindu nationalist view. As I outline in the following, Savarkar and Golwalkar see conflict and war as undesirable but inevitable as long as the world comprises selfish and parochially-minded communities. Hence, they recommend that India cultivate the willingness and ability to engage in war and power politics in order to be able to fend off external aggression. In this respect, I argue, their view of international politics bears a family resemblance to realist strains of international relations theory, which lay equal, if not greater, weight on the acquisition of all possible ‘capabilities’.\(^11\) But the family resemblance runs only so far, because, unlike theorists in the realist tradition, Savarkar and Golwalkar take the view that national power depends heavily on the cultivation of an assertive and exclusionary nationalism. What explains this striking divergence? It owes, as we shall see, to their belief that only this brand of nationalism can provide India with the martial spirit and social cohesion it needs to defend itself against external aggression.

The benefit of uncovering this relationship between international politics and nationalism in Hindu nationalist thought is that it opens up the possibility of challenging Savarkar and Golwalkar on their own terms by showing that an exclusionary nationalism actually undermines national power. Such a critique, which distinguishes between the relatively less controversial premise that Savarkar and Golwalkar start out with and the highly controversial conclusion they draw from it, will obviously be at variance with traditional critiques of Hindu nationalism, which are averse to casting arguments in the language of national power. But such a critique is worth pursuing because it will likely be more effective in combating any chauvinism that may be provoked by the challenging international environment that India faces in the decades ahead.

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7 Ibid., p. 317.

Before I elaborate on these claims outlined, I want to preemptively address an important interpretative issue. I recognise that a close focus on Savarkar and Golwalkar may raise questions about the scope of the claims made in this essay. No doubt a full treatment of the Hindu nationalist view of international politics needs to account for the influence of the intellectuals and activists that preceded Savarkar and Golwalkar (including Swami Vivekananda, Swami Dayanand and Aurobindo Ghose in the late 19th century, and Lala Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra Pal and Bal Gangadhar Tilak in the early 20th century), and for the transformations wrought by the leaders and statesmen that succeeded them (a list that includes Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, Balraj Madhok, Deendayal Upadhyaya, Atal Behari Vajpayee, Lal Krishna Advani, and Jaswant Singh).^12

Unfortunately, it is not possible to pursue such a thorough examination in the limited space available here. Moreover, it is reasonable to focus on Savarkar and Golwalkar, since they, above all others, offer something approximating a "theory" of international politics. By contrast, the thinkers and statesmen that have succeeded them appear to have had little inclination or opportunity to put forward a fully developed view of international politics. This is not to suggest that we can, therefore, safely ignore these prominent figures. Rather, it emphasises the fact that while there is much that is missing from this study, it at least has the virtue of focusing on the most developed part of the canon.

### A Theory of International Politics

Let me begin with Savarkar's theory of international politics. The starting point of his theory is the premise that a universal state or a worldwide federation constitutes the highest ideal in politics. This claim will likely come as a surprise to those who see Savarkar as fixated on national power and glory, but consider how he describes his political views in a letter written in 1920. He says:

> We believe in an universal state embracing all mankind and wherein all men and women would be citizens working for and enjoying equally the fruits of this earth and this sun, this land and this light, which constitute the real Motherland and the Fatherland of man. All other divisions and distinctions are artificial though indispensable.\(^a\)

This is a fascinating passage because it shows Savarkar to be something less than a 'true believer' in the idea of the nation. That is, unlike the 19th-century theorists of nationalism by whom he is said to have been inspired, he does not seem to believe that nations represent genuine racially or ethnically distinct peoples. At the same time, this passage makes clear that Savarkar is no cosmopolitan either, since he clearly does not believe that mankind ought to shed national distinctions. I will explain shortly why he sees these distinctions as 'indispensable'. But first I want to get across the point that Savarkar does not view national distinctions as constituting an inherent source of conflict. On the contrary, he views co-operation between nations as feasible and desirable so long as they treat each other as equals. This is why, he claims, he can "conscientiously cooperate" with the British if they are willing to grant Indians constitutional rights (a reference to the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, which promised to gradually expand self-government in India). As 'humanity is higher patriotism', Savarkar writes, 'any Empire or Commonwealth that succeeds in welding numbers of conflicting races and nations in one harmonious, if not homogeneous, whole in such ways as to render each of them better fitted to realise, enrich and enjoy life in all its noble aspects is a distinct step to the realisation of that ideal'.\(^b\)

He defends his revolutionary activities against the British on the same basis. 'It was this very principle that humanity was a higher patriotism that made us so restless', he claims, for 'when we saw that a part of it should aggrandise and swell like a virulent cancer in such ways as to threaten the life of the human whole', it 'forced us for want of any other effective remedy to take to the Surgeon's knife'.\(^c\)

It is not unreasonable to be sceptical about the tenor and content of the earlier remarks as they came at a time when Savarkar

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\(^b\) Ibid., pp. 33–34.

\(^c\) Savarkar, *Echoes from Andaman*, pp. 27, 34.
had been pleading with the British for the commutation of a long prison sentence that had begun in 1910. The circumstances, one might imagine, likely gave Savarkar an incentive to present himself as far more peaceable than he really was. However, it is worth noting that Savarkar appears to have made similar remarks both in the years prior to his imprisonment and in the years following his return to freedom, a fact that suggests that his views on international politics at least cannot be straightforwardly attributed to his circumstances. Consider, for example, his annual address before the Hindu Mahasabha in 1938, where he states that ‘the Ideal of Politics itself ought to be a Human state, all mankind for its citizen, the earth for its motherland’. The same point is made with even greater emphasis in an address to the same body, the previous year:

When a nation or community treads upon the rights of sister nations or communities and aggressively stands in the way of forming larger associations and aggregates of mankind, its nationalism or communalism becomes condemnable from a human point of view. This is the acid test of distinguishing a justifiable nationalism or communalism from an unjust and harmful one.

Fascinating as these passages are, I want to caution against placing a great deal of weight on them. I cite them only to underscore that Savarkar does not begin his account of international politics with the premise that war or violence between nations is desirable. That said, it is vital to understand that Savarkar believes that conflict between nations is almost inevitable because of the human tendency toward parochialism and selfishness. The former, he writes, ‘is responsible for dreadful wars throughout human history’. The latter, he


18 See, for example, the defence offered on behalf of revolutionary activity in Vinayak D. Savarkar, The Indian War of Independence 1857 (Bombay: Phoenix, 1947), pp. 273–74. This work was first published in 1908.


20 Ibid., p. 8.

21 Ibid.

repeatedly observes, is hard to strip away from mankind, a point made most clearly in his critique of Buddhism:

Buddhism had made the first and yet the greatest attempt to propagate a universal religion. ‘Go, ye Bhikkus, to all the ten directions of the world and preach the law of Righteousness!’ Truly, it was a law of Righteousness. It had no ulterior end in view, no lust for land or lure quickening its steps; but grand though its achievements were it could not eradicate the seeds of animal passions nor of political ambitions nor of individual aggrandisement in the minds of all men...

This pessimistic view of mankind leads Savarkar to an operating premise very different from the one we started with, namely, that the human condition is scarred by an incessant ‘terrible struggle for existence’, which makes ‘survival of the fittest’ the rule in nature. From this premise Savarkar draws the inference that a willingness to defend oneself using all available means is necessary, and therefore, ultimately, moral. ‘Call it a law of nature or the will of God as you like’, he says, but ‘the iron fact remains that there is no room for absolute non-violence in nature’. The lesson of history, he says, is that

[...]

13 Nations which, other things equal, are superior in military strength are bound to survive, flourish and dominate while those which are militarily weak shall be politically subjected or cease to exist at all. It is idle to say, we shall add a new chapter to history but you cannot add to or take away a syllable from the iron law of nature itself. Even today, as hare, who is in possession of cellars, they can carry all your mandirs and mosques, culture and cultivation, Arahats and Ashrams — then a man once he is laid down to sleep a dozen years pass by!

So far I have been describing Savarkar’s chain of thought. I now hasten to add that Golwalkar operates under broadly the same set


23 Savarkar, HRD, p. 15. Also see Keer, Veer Savarkar, pp. 271–73.

24 Savarkar, HRD, p. 84.

25 Ibid., p. 85.
of premises. To start, not unlike Savarkar, Golwalkar claims on the very first page of his *Bunch of Thoughts* that ‘the ideal of human unity, of a world free from all traces of conflict and misery, has stirred our hearts since times immemorial’. And, also, like Savarkar, Golwalkar emphasises that the ‘hard reality’ is quite disheartening. He writes:

Today, humanity is divided and subdivided into so many small exclusive groups called nations or states, each one of them devoted to its own narrow self-interest. And it is a matter of common experience that wherever there are groups inspired only by self-interest, there is bound to be mutual conflict. Obviously, human unity and welfare is impossible so long as this type of conflict continues.\(^{29}\)

This deplorable condition, Golwalkar notes, leads to the demand that nationalism ‘be rooted out from the minds of men all over the world’.\(^{28}\) But he demurs on this point. Even more than Savarkar, he takes the view that a strict cosmopolitanism (or what he terms ‘internationalism’) is neither desirable nor necessary. It is undesirable because nationalism in its own way helps combat self-interest, as it inspires the spirit of real service and sacrifice in the individual.\(^{29}\) Since nationalism is instrumentally desirable in this way, ‘it cannot and should not be destroyed’, according to Golwalkar.\(^{30}\) Consequently, the problem, he says, ‘boils down to one of achieving a synthesis of national aspirations and world welfare’.\(^{21}\) In this regard Golwalkar readily admits that mankind has long struggled to find a convincing solution to this problem. In his view, past efforts to develop a synthesis between national aspirations and world welfare have failed because they have been attempted by societies that, steeped in materialism, have been unable to sustain a love for mankind. He observes:

From the materialist point of view we are all gross entities, each separate and exclusive in itself, who can have no bonds of mutual affinity or affection.

\(^{25}\) Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts*, p. 2.
\(^{27}\) Ibid.
\(^{26}\) Ibid.
\(^{29}\) Ibid., p. 3.
\(^{30}\) Ibid.
\(^{31}\) Ibid.

There can also be no inner restraint in such beings, which can make them control their selfishness from running amuck, in the interest of the humanity as a whole. After all, any arrangement evolved for achieving world welfare can be fruitful only to the extent the men behind it are inspired by real love for mankind which will enable them to mould their individual and national conduct in tune with the welfare of humanity. Without that supreme urge, any scheme, however good its purpose may be, will only provide one more alluring mask for the agrandizement of power-drunk nations. That has been the uniform verdict of history right up to the present times.\(^{32}\)

The only way to defeat this destructive materialism, Golwalkar argues, is to turn to transcendentalism. It is only the ‘occasional realisation’ of our ‘innate oneness’, he argues, ‘that inspires us to strive for the happiness of others’.\(^{30}\) Consequently, the search for world unity and human welfare can be realised, he concludes, ‘only to the extent mankind realises this common Inner Bond, which alone can subdue the passions and discords stemming from materialism, broaden the horizon of the human mind and harmonise the individual and national aspirations with the welfare of mankind’.\(^{34}\) Notably, he does not see such transcendentalism as threatening national attachments, because in his view individuals, groups, and nations all have distinct identities that can be expressed in a manner that does not produce conflict or disorder. He writes:

Needless to say, the idea of creating a Stateless condition, of levelling all human beings to one particular plane of physical existence, ensnaring their individual and group traits, is foreign to us. The World State of our concept will, therefore, evolve out of a federation of autonomous and self-constrained nations under a common centre linking them all.\(^{35}\)

No doubt Golwalkar’s concept of an organic ‘World State’ raises serious questions, foremost being the concern that it may contain elements of domination (rare indeed is the concept of an organic

\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. 5.
\(^{34}\) Ibid.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., p. 6.
order that does not contain elements of domination]. This conceptual
matter becomes a more distant concern once we see how Golwalkar
envisions the world coming to heed transcendentalism. In contrast
to Savarkar, who argues that a worldwide federation is desirable,
but likely unreachable, Golwalkar argues that it is India's 'destiny'
to make the impossible possible on account of Hinduism's rooted-
ness in transcendental philosophy. It is the 'unique national genius'
of the Hindu people, he says, 'to realise the dream of world unity
and human welfare.'

It is not entirely clear as to what this is meant to imply in practice: he refers to both an 'empire of the Spirit', as well as to the 'political empires' of ancient India that expanded quite some distance beyond the subcontinent. At any rate, the point to note is that Golwalkar is quite clear that India cannot fulfill its 'destiny' until and unless it is able to stand up for itself. As he puts it:

How can a society given to self-derision, weakened by all-round disruption and dissipation, kicked and humiliated at every point by any and every bully in the world, teach the world: How can one, devoid of the urge or the capacity to emulate one's own life, show the path of greatness to others?

In light of this observation we should not be surprised to find Golwalkar changing his tone and counseling Indians to come to terms with power politics and the ever-present threat of war. Thus he warns his readers that 'it is in the nature of predatory nations to overrun, plunder and destroy other weaker countries.' He goes on to say: 'whatever the strategy, the basic rule of relations between nations is the law of the jungle - the strong feeding upon the weak and getting stronger'.

Golwalkar makes the point that Savarkar's and Golwalkar's differences and prescriptions diverge from the realist tradition. As will quickly become clear, this divergence constitutes the more controversial aspect of their theory.

From the premise that the international order is characterised by lawlessness, Savarkar and Golwalkar draw a number of inferences familiar to students of international politics. For example, Savarkar advocates entering into alliances and partaking in balance of power politics whenever this is likely to bolster India's position vis-à-vis the threat of the day. 'The sanest policy for us, which practical politics demand', he says, 'is to befriend those who are likely to serve our country's interests in spite of any "ism" they follow for themselves, and to befriend only so long as it serves our purpose.' As evidence, he points to events preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, focusing in particular on the relationship between England and America. He observes:

Were not these very Americans although her own kith and kin, held up by England before the world as the most faithful and treacherous type of humanity in spite of the fact that they were republicans when they revolted against England and secured their independence? And yet now that a close alliance with America is almost the last refuge guaranteeing any certainty of saving England from a disastrous defeat, what desperate love has locked John Bull and Uncle Sam into an inseparable embrace?

Golwalkar makes much the same point. If there is one lesson to be gleaned from the story of the permutations and combinations of the relationships between nations of Europe in the last few centuries, he says, it is that 'nations change their friends and foes as it suits their self-interest.' That being said, Golwalkar keenly emphasises that alliances must not be considered substitutes for national power since 'the strong do not desire the friendship of the weak except to

35 Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, p. 6.
37 Ibid., p. 7. Also see Madhav S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined
(Nagpur: Bharat Prakashan, 1939), p. 76.
38 Ibid., pp. 8-9; also see pp. 270-71.
39 Ibid., p. 213; also see pp. 265-66.
40 Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, p. 270.
41 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Chap. 6.
42 HRD, p. 81. Also see Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, p. 260.
43 HRD, p. 81.
44 Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, p. 260.
exploit the latter.\textsuperscript{45} When we read the world correctly, he argues, 'we are forced to arrive at the simple conclusion that the only basis for our free and prosperous national life is invincible national strength—a strength that will strike terror into the hearts of aggressive powers and make other nations seek our friendship'.\textsuperscript{46}

Curiously enough, even as Savarkar and Golwalkar make these fairly predictable sorts of inferences, they take what is, to modern minds at least, an unusual view of the sources of national power. In the first place they are firmly united in the belief that national power vitally depends on people having a martial spirit. For example:

> What is that real and inexhaustible source of national strength? It is the consolidated, dedicated and disciplined life of the people as a whole. After all, the various spheres of national life are only so many manifestations of the innate strength of the people. Political power is one such manifestation. Military power is the well-disciplined, intensely patriotic and heroic attitude of the people.\textsuperscript{47}

It hardly needs to be pointed out that Golwalkar's view, as stated above, differs from the contemporary realist belief that what ultimately counts in international politics is relative state power, which is usually measured in terms of a well-equipped professional military, an effective bureaucracy, especially in the areas of intelligence and planning, and economic heft. I hasten to add that Golwalkar's view is not necessarily at odds with this view, since cultivating a martial spirit in the people does not preclude the cultivation of state power. Moreover, Golwalkar, I should underscore, is hardly averse to the acquisition of weaponry.\textsuperscript{48} Nonetheless, central to his view is the notion that arms by themselves are inadequate in the absence of a martial spirit necessary for their use. 'It is not the gun but the heart behind it that fights', he says. So, 'without a strong patriotic heart no amount of arms and ammunition will save the country'.\textsuperscript{49}

It is not difficult to discern the reasons behind Golwalkar's and Savarkar's focus on the martial spirit of the people. In part both were responding to the belief, widespread since the Hindu Renaissance of the late 19th century, that Hindus were an unmanly race.\textsuperscript{50} It is no coincidence then that when Golwalkar proclaims the need for Indians to develop 'strong and healthy bodies', he should quote Swami Vivekananda, the most prominent spokesman of that era, as saying that 'I want men with muscles of iron and nerves of steel'.\textsuperscript{51} For much the same reason we find Savarkar celebrating the decision of the British to send Indian soldiers to the battlefields of Europe during World War I:

> It sent a thrill of delight in my heart to hear that the Indian troops were allowed to go to Europe, in their thousands to fight against the best military power in the world and that they had acquired themselves with such splendour and were covered with military glory. Thank God! Manliness after all is not dead yet in the land!\textsuperscript{52}

The more immediate factor motivating Savarkar's and Golwalkar's emphasis on cultivating a martial spirit was the need they felt to combat the doctrine of non-violence popularised by Mahatma Gandhi.\textsuperscript{53} From their perspective, this 'doctrinal plague', as Savarkar termed it, added insult to the injury because it sought to kill the very martial instinct of the Hindu race and had succeeded to an alarming extent in doing so.\textsuperscript{54} Therefore, the need of the hour, as he saw it, was to 'whip up military enthusiasm amongst the Hindus'.\textsuperscript{55} Most immediately, this need was met by practical measures such as Savarkar's calls in the late 1930s for Hindus to be drafted into the war effort so that they may 'get themselves re-animated and re-born into a martial race'.\textsuperscript{56} But ultimately it was necessary to directly confront the legitimacy of Gandhi's doctrine. Savarkar was only too willing to take up the challenge. 'We denounce your doctrine of absolute non-violence not because we are less saintly but because we are


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 49.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., pp. 12–13.


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 86.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 85.
more sensible than you are', he thundered. 'Relative non-violence is our creed', he declared, 'therefore, we worship the defensive sword as the first saviour of man.

This reference to self-defence should not be overlooked. Neither Savarkar nor Golwalkar view the cultivation of martial spiritedness as preparation for the undertaking of expansionary wars. Rather, they appear to have thought that martial spiritedness, by strengthening Indian resolve, would serve to deter potential aggressors. Consider, for example, Golwalkar's statements in the wake of India's defeat to China in 1962. 'The thinking in our country during the last few decades has been one of looking down upon strength as something sinful and reprehensible', he writes. Indeed, 'we have begun to look upon strength as violence and to glorify our weakness'.

This line of thought is actually counterproductive, Golwalkar argues, because weakness incites the predatory appetites of other nations, whereas strength provides the foundation for the genuine practice of non-violence. As is so often the case in Golwalkar's writings, the point is made through a parable:

Suppose a strong man is going on a road and somebody knocks against him. If the strong man says with compassion, 'All right, my dear fellow, I excuse you for the wrong you have done me', then we say that the strong man has practised non-violence. For, though he is capable of giving him a blow and smashing his skull, he has restrained himself. Suppose, a thin, lean man – just a mosquito! – is going and somebody pulls his ears and the 'mosquito' trembling from head to foot says, 'Sir, I excuse you', who will believe him? Who will say that he is practising non-violence?

So far I have been making the case that one aspect of Savarkar's and Golwalkar's understanding of national power is that they see it as depending heavily on the martial spirit of the people. The other aspect of their understanding of national power is that they see it as depending heavily on social cohesion. Consider, for example, the following passage from Golwalkar:

Let us now look for the source of such a strength. Where does it reside? We say, it lies in the organised life of the people. But, what type of people?

They should be such as are imbued with unity of mind and thought, bound together with a common code of morality and faith in each other, and filled with absolute loyalty to the nation. Unless they are such, their organised strength is not likely to protect the nation.

In one sense, there is little mystery as to why Savarkar and Golwalkar view social cohesion as a vital component of national power. It is because, like so many of their generation, they attribute the conquest of India by the British to disunity in Indian society, which 'allowed foreigners to come in'. And they attribute the power of these foreigners in turn to the idea of nationalism. 'Europeans, as Nations, are free and strong and progressive', Golwalkar argues, 'for the simple reason that they have cherished and do still foster correct national consciousness.'

Given these premises, it is hardly surprising that both Savarkar and Golwalkar try to foster social cohesion in the Indian context by constructing a national identity that could motivate individuals and communities to present external aggressors with a united front. For both, the first step in this direction is to prove the existence of an Indian nation. This explains their self-consciously creative use of history. Savarkar, in particular, is quite explicit that history ought to be interpreted with a view towards its use. As he writes in the introduction to The Indian War of Independence, 'a nation must develop its capacity not only of claiming a past but also of knowing how to use it for the furtherance of its future. The nation ought to be the master and not the slave of its own history.' But, as is well known, this creative process directly leads to the most controversial and unpleasant aspect of Savarkar's and Golwalkar's political theories – the claim that Hindus should be the rulers of India. What explains this turn of events? Why exactly does the search for social cohesion end up leading to an exclusionary nationalism? To see why Savarkar and

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57 HRD, p. 85.
58 Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, p. 271.
59 Ibid., pp. 271-72.
60 Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, p. 48.
63 Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined, pp. 18-19.
64 Savarkar, Indian War of Independence, p. xxiii.
Golwalkar think social cohesion depends on exclusion, it is vital to meditate on the following passage from *Essentials of Hinduuta*

"Every thing that is common in us with our enemies, weakens our power of opposing them. The foe that has nothing in common with us is the foe likely to be most bitterly resisted by us just as a friend that has almost everything in him that we admire and prize in ourselves is likely to be the friend we love most."  

I submit that this passage is the single most important in Savarkar's corpus, and by extension in the canon of Hindu nationalist thought. It places before us, quite clearly, the *instrumental* nature of Savarkar's brand of nationalism: its purpose is to provide Indians with a corporate identity sufficient to motivate them to rally in opposition to external aggression. Nowhere is this truer than with regard to the religious aspect of Savarkar's nationalism: he readily assumes that men are most willing to fight when they believe they are defending their religion. History, he says, teaches that the necessity of creating a bitter sense of wrong and invoking a power of undying resistance is accomplished best "by cutting off even the semblance of a common worship." Conversely, when such exclusivity is missing, Savarkar argues, history shows that "the tie of common Holyland has at times proved stronger than the chains of a Motherland", citing as examples not only Muslims in India, but also Jews in Europe, Christians in Turkey, and Germans in America, who, as members of multi-religious, multi-ethnic polities, find "their love is divided". 

With respect to the former, Savarkar infamously says, 

"Look at the Mohammedans. Mere* convexity* to them is a stern reality than Delhi or Agra. Some of them do not make any secret of being bound to sacrifice all India if that be to the glory of Islam or could save the city of their prophet."  

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66 Ibid., p. 24.  
67 Ibid., pp. 139-40.  
68 Ibid., p. 135. Bear in mind that Savarkar was writing in the wake of the pan-Islamic Khilafat movement. This movement, led by Muslims in India, demanded that the British protect the sovereignty of the Khilafah (the Ottoman Sultan or Caliph) in Turkey following the end of World War I. For more see Francis Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims*.  
69 Ibid.  
71 Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts*, p. 265.  
72 Ibid., p. 265.
As this passage shows, Golwalkar, like Savarkar, believes that ideas that foster transnational attachments are likely to have a visceral effect on an individual’s willingness to make sacrifices on behalf of his nation. Hence, we should not be surprised to find Golwalkar too expressing distrust of the patriotism of Muslims and Christians in India on the grounds that their sympathies can easily drift toward their co-religionists, who live beyond India’s borders. By contrast, a Hindu, he claims, can never have any ‘any conflict in his mind between Steadtharma [duty] and Swadish [country]; there has always been identification between the two’.73

A Realist Critique of Hindu Nationalism

Thus far I have been outlining Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s theory of international politics. I have made the case that their theory starts out from a premise familiar to students of realism, that is, the view that the international arena is characterised by lawlessness and the ever-present threat of war. From this premise Savarkar and Golwalkar draw a number of predictable inferences, the most notable being the idea that anarchy in the international arena makes it rational for politics to cultivate power in order to secure their continued existence. However, Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s understanding of what constitutes national power, I have argued, diverges quite substantially from contemporary realist thinking. In their view, national power depends at least as much on martial spiritedness and social cohesiveness as it does on material factors such as economic heft and astute leadership. In this section I want to offer a few critical comments on this aspect of their theory.

There are, broadly speaking, two ways in which one could challenge Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s theories of international politics. In the first instance, one could challenge the operational premise they adopt as well as the inferences that follow from it. In the Indian context, such a challenge has long been offered by Nehruvians, who emphasise the potential for international co-operation, and Gandhians, who emphasise the importance of non-violence. The former, as Bajpai has written, have taken the view that ‘states can overcome the rigours of anarchy and fashion at least seasons and locales of peace and co-operation’.74 The latter, as Martha Nussbaum has put it, have argued that ‘being a “real man” is not a matter of being aggressive and bashing others; it is a matter of controlling one’s own instincts to aggression and standing up to provocation with only one’s human dignity to defend oneself’.75 I will not pursue these lines of criticism here in part because other scholars, most notably Bajpai, have already examined them at length.76 The more immediate reason though is that I want to draw attention toward an alternative, potentially more effective, way of challenging Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s theories of international politics. This is to show that an exclusionary nationalism actually hinders, rather than enhances, national power. As this statement implies, such a critique would start out from a premise that is quite at variance with Nehruvian and Gandhian thinking about international politics. Unlike them, this critique would accept the central tenant of realism – that national power is in fact the ultimate arbiter of national fate. But – and this is the point to note – it would disagree sharply with Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s view that an exclusionary nationalism contributes to national power. I see three points of disagreement in particular.

The first is that the identity politics fostered by Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s nationalism is not likely to be able to secure domestic peace and stability, which are vital components of national power. This is because, as Pratap Bhanu Mehta has warned, striving to attain a singular national identity, particularly in a country as diverse as India, is an ‘inherently dangerous’ quest that will always leave ‘some subset of citizens’ at risk of persecution.77 Under the circumstances, it is far more preferable for Indians to learn to ‘live on the basis of difference’.78 The alternative is incomprehensible. Ashutosh Varshney is exactly right when he says that, ‘to believe that 110 million Muslims can be beaten into submission is to believe a lie.'

73 Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, p. 170.
74 Bajpai, ‘Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice’, p. 239.
76 Bajpai, ‘Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice.’
78 Ibid.
a most dangerous lie. Needless to say, a move in this direction would greatly exacerbate the alienation and sense of vulnerability felt by members of this community. It would only invite them to support and indeed take recourse to extremism, thus compelling the state to address internal rather than external challenges to security and order. The evidence here is plentiful; consider, for instance, the upsurge in home-grown terrorism in India following the anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat in 2002. The ultimate consequence of all this is enervation. As Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul have argued, focusing on ‘debilitating internal issues – such as building temples on contested sites and suppressing minority rights – is likely to take India away from its central goals of speedily achieving internal cohesion, prosperity, and international status.

The second way in which an exclusionary nationalism threatens national power is by hampering economic development. This is because the pursuit of such a form of nationalism is invariably accompanied by demands for the maintenance of cultural purity and a corresponding hostility toward the disruptions brought about by modernity, particularly the individualism and materialism encouraged by free enterprise and the cosmopolitanism fostered by interconnectedness. Indeed, we do not have to look too hard to see Golwalkar making complaints of this sort. Yet if India’s economy is to develop, these disruptions can hardly be avoided. If there is one lesson to be learnt from contemporary economic history, it is that trade and commerce are essential to economic growth, as evidenced by the incredible rise of China and the ‘Asian Tigers’. And if there is a second lesson to be learnt, it is that maintaining economic competitiveness in an era of rapid technological development depends on being able to attract highly skilled migrants, as evidenced by America’s leadership in the area of advanced engineering and information technology, which owes in no small measure to the inward flow of talent. It hardly needs to be pointed out that a nation that founds its identity along racial, ethnic or religious lines is unlikely to be able to be able to attract, much less absorb, talented immigrants.

Finally, it should be noted that pluralism within India constitutes an important power resource in itself. In part, this is because the internal diversity fostered by pluralism creates many more potential channels of contacts with other societies and cultures. The distinctively social character of India’s relationship with the United States is a case in point. This relationship has been built on the back of increasingly robust exchanges of peoples, ideas and norms, a development that in turn has served to bolster a deep-seated economic relationship based on cross-investment. An India that is fearful of cultural ‘contamination’ will be ill-equipped to take advantage of such opportunities. Furthermore, the norms and practices fostered by pluralism improve India’s chances of being able to fashion and uphold the principles of co-existence, particularly in Asia. This, in turn, may help make other societies and cultures somewhat less wary of India’s increasing power and influence than they otherwise would be. This is not an insubstantial advantage when one considers the enormous cultural barriers and corresponding distrust that China, by comparison, is likely to encounter as it attempts to exert power across the globe.

This is all that I will say for now. The rationale behind this essay has been to illuminate the Hindu nationalist view of international politics, rather than to try to challenge it at length. That being said, let me close by explaining why further study along these lines may prove valuable. Earlier in this essay I noted that few scholars have chosen to examine the Hindu nationalist view of international politics because the BJP did not introduce significant discontinuities in Indian foreign policy during its terms in office. From this record one may conclude that there is little reason to be concerned about Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s increasingly distant mutterings. But this, I think, is to take far too narrow a view of the matter. In order to comprehend the continuing relevance of Savarkar and Golwalkar, we need to reflect on the conditions under which their ideas were formed and gained traction. Both lived in the first half of the 20th century, a time when India confronted a whirlpool of anxieties.

Now look to the future. Is it possible to envision such circumstances ever returning, thus setting the stage for a revival of Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s ideas? I can see at least two such possible openings. For one, it is conceivable that the great powers of the day, the Americans, the Chinese and the Europeans, will respond to India’s increasing power and influence with something other than equanimity. Consider, in this respect, their concerted disapproval of India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine that China, with its burgeoning ambition and history of conflict with India, will be able to transition to great power status without stepping on at least a few toes. Given all this, I think it behooves us to consider the effect that such events could have on Indian minds. If world history is any indication of what is possible, it would seem that a renewed sense of inferiority or humiliation will likely unleash a fierce bout of chauvinism, not unlike what occurred in Russia, Japan and Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, where gross reverses followed from what Isaiah Berlin has described as ‘the inlaid desire of the insufficiently regarded to count for something among the cultures of the world’. Should the same desire descend on India, it is not unlikely that appeals to the ideas of Nehru, Gandhi and Tagore, will be met by this passage from Golwalkar:

The world is not prepared to listen to the philosophy, however sublime, of the weak. There is an old incident, which appeared in many of our important papers. Our great national bard Rabindranath Tagore had gone to Japan. He was to address the University students on the greatness of Hindu philosophy. But the lecture hall remained vacant except for a few professors! Thinking that such a poor show would be an insult to the distinguished visitor, one of the professors tried to persuade the students, who were standing far away, to attend the lecture. The students firmly refused saying, “We do not want to listen to the philosophy of a slave nation!”

As such stories of humiliation easily segue into pleas on behalf of an exclusionary nationalism, I think it is important that we become prepared to take on Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s ideas on their own terms, that is, to make counterarguments that show how an exclusionary nationalism undermines national power. I suspect that the traditional critics of Hindu nationalism will consider this course of action distasteful. In their view, Indians ought to oppose an exclusionary nationalism because it is intrinsically undesirable. While I am deeply sympathetic to this point of view and obviously condone efforts to foster a liberal public culture in India, I nonetheless fear that if we do not also make the case that an exclusionary nationalism undermines national power, then we face the risk that this dangerous idea will surge to the forefront of public consciousness, if not at the first sign of trouble then surely at the outbreak of hostilities. In the event we will have reason to be doubly sad, because our insistence on challenging this ideal in the old way will in part have contributed to its strength on the day of reckoning.

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83 For example, see Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Roiling Asia’, Foreign Affairs, 77, 6 (1998).