The strategic worldview of India’s political elite is typically described as having evolved in linear fashion. At the time of Independence in 1947 there was ostensibly a broad consensus on the ends and means of diplomacy, which included peaceful co-existence and anti-imperialism on the one hand, and non-alignment and non-violence on the other. This consensus, crafted by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is depicted as having weakened over subsequent decades, eventually collapsing when diplomatic isolation and near bankruptcy at the end of the Cold War compelled the adoption of a more pragmatic approach to foreign relations.

A number of leading scholars subscribe to this standard narrative. The most notable example is Stephen Cohen’s *India: Emerging Power* where, writing in the wake of the election of the National Democratic Alliance, and the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 Kargil War, Cohen observes:

> Until recently, it was possible to speak of “the” Indian strategic perspective. Centered in New Delhi, it was dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru’s view of India and the world. The Nehruvian consensus has long since broken down. Many profess to subscribe to Nehru’s principles but assert that circumstances have changed, and so must Indian policy.¹

The challengers to the Nehruvian consensus, Cohen contends, focus on the attainment and exercise of power. Their intellectual origin lies outside the Congress Party, and their appeal has rested in significant measure on disenchantment with Nehruvian principles that have been seen as rendering India militarily weak, economically vulnerable, and diplomatically isolated. As Cohen puts it:

> The Nehruvian mainstream has been credibly challenged by an alliance of two different perspectives on security and foreign policy. The first is a renascent conservative-realist perspective, the second a more ideologically driven “Hindutva” viewpoint. Both groups have found a home in the BJP.²

Is this narrative historically accurate? At least one prominent commentator—C. Raja Mohan—has already expressed doubt. “There is a widespread belief among those
who study India’s external relations that there was once a golden age of ‘Nehruvian consensus’ on foreign policy,” Mohan writes. Indeed, the term “Nehruvian consensus” is treated as “axiomatic,” and is “rarely contested.” Yet, a “dispassionate look,” he cautions, “might suggest that there was no national consensus either before or after independence.” This essay shows that Mohan’s warning is well founded. Though a full accounting of the strategic worldviews of India’s political elite requires delving into intellectual and cultural history dating back to the mid nineteenth century, our point can be made more economically here by examining the Constituent Assembly Debates. The debates show that India’s political elites have long held conflicting worldviews, and that realism in strategic matters has deeper and more varied roots in India than scholars tend to realize. As such this essay contributes to the upsurge in scholarship on Indian strategic culture sparked by George Tanham’s seminal essay on the subject. In contrast with contemporary scholarship, most notably the work of Kanti Bajpai, which focuses on the diversity of views in the post-Independence era, this essay focuses on the Republic’s neglected founding phase, which is shown to be more factious and diverse than has hitherto been realized.

The Debate on Article 51
Charged with drafting a new Constitution for India, the Constituent Assembly met over a nearly 3-year period starting in December 1946. Given the significance of its mission, the assembly predictably featured many leading figures. Its nearly 300 delegates came from a wide range of backgrounds. The vast majority of these delegates were affiliated with the Congress Party. Nonetheless, the Congress Party’s decision to nominate individuals representing rival viewpoints and the interests of ethnic and religious minorities meant that the assembly’s proceedings featured a genuinely wide range of voices. The assembly was, as Granville Austin famously put it, “India in Microcosm”—it was “representative of India.”

The Constituent Assembly addressed the subject of international relations frontally on two occasions. The first involved deliberations on what subsequently became Article 51 of the Constitution. The article provides that:

The State shall endeavour to:

a. promote international peace and security;
b. maintain just and honourable relations between nations;
c. foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another; and
d. encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.

Why did the assembly enact this provision? One hint comes in the Objectives Resolution moved by Jawaharlal Nehru on December 13, 1946, which declared that India intended to “make its full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and the welfare of mankind.” This statement suggests that Article 51 was not adopted by chance or in haste—the assembly’s delegates were concerned from the outset about international peace and order. But why? At one level the provision the widely
held belief that the United Nation’s creation signaled an imminent transition from a brutish world of sovereign states to a law governed order. But the assembly’s deliberations suggest that the delegates had a deeper reason to support to Article 51. Consider in particular the prominent closing statement that Rajendra Prasad, the president of the Constituent Assembly, delivered on November 26, 1949, prior to the tabling of the Constitution. Summarizing the “salient features” of the Constitution, Prasad observed:

There is a special provision in our Directive Principles to which I attach great importance. We have not provided for the good of our people only but have laid down in our directive principles that our State shall endeavour to promote material peace and security, maintain just and honourable relations between nations, foster respect for international law and treaty obligations and encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration. In a world torn with conflicts, in a world which even after the devastation of two world wars is still depending on armaments to establish peace and goodwill, we are destined to play a great part, if we prove true to the teachings of the Father of the Nation and give effect to this directive principle in our Constitution. Let us have faith in ourselves and in the teachings of the Master whose portrait hangs over my head and we shall fulfill the hopes and prove true to the best interests of not only our country but of the world at large.\(^\text{10}\)

The emotive nature of these remarks suggests that the inclusion of Article 51 was not merely pro forma. On the contrary, Prasad’s remarks imply that the assembly viewed the provision as embodying universally cherished Gandhian principles. But as we show below, the provenance as well as the passage of Article 51 tells a different story.

It is not well known that the language of Article 51 originates not with the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, but rather in the utterly obscure ‘Declaration of Havana’ adopted on November 30, 1939 by the Second Conference of American States Members at the International Labor Organization (ILO). At this conference the “Governments, employers, and work-people of the American Continent” declared, among other things:

their unshaken faith in the promotion of international cooperation and in the imperative need for achieving international peace and security by the elimination of war as an instrument of national policy, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments and by the maintenance of justice and the scrupulous respect for treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another.\(^\text{11}\)

This statement was hardly ground-breaking; it was taken almost verbatim from the Preamble to the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations.\(^\text{12}\) One of the observers at the conference was prominent journalist and labor unionist, B. Shiva Rao, the younger brother of the future Constitutional Advisor, B.N. Rau. Rao appears to have shared a copy of the Havana Declaration with his elder brother, who subsequently incorporated
it into his September 2, 1946 “Notes on Fundamental Rights,” prepared in anticipation of the meeting of the Constituent Assembly in December 1946. Rau’s version stated:

The State shall promote international peace and security by the elimination of war as an instrument of national policy by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments and by the maintenance of justice and the scrupulous respect for treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another.\(^\text{13}\)

This provision, Rau conceded, was “really in the nature of moral precepts for the authorities of the State.” “Although it may be contended that the Constitution is not the proper place for moral precepts” the provision in question was worth retaining, he argued, because “constitutional declarations of policy of this kind are now becoming increasingly frequent,” and have “at least an educative value” (a baffling assertion, it must be said, in view of the fate of the League of Nations, and the failure of ‘open diplomacy’ in particular).\(^\text{14}\) On March 31, 1947 the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights, which came under the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities, and Tribal and Excluded Areas, took up Rau’s note. The Sub-Committee accepted the provision outlined above and its April 3 Draft Report formalized the distinction that Rau had alluded to between “justiciable” and “non-justiciable” rights. The language from the Havana Declaration was incorporated under the latter category (subsequently termed the Directive Principles of State Policy).\(^\text{15}\)

The next development came at the April 15 meeting of the Sub-Committee when the members decided to strike from the provision framed by Rau the words “by the elimination of war as an instrument of national policy.”\(^\text{16}\) Though no explanation is offered in the documentary records subsequently published by Rao, it seems reasonable to infer that the Sub-Committee thought the declaration overambitious, since no alternative wording appears to have been proposed. As a result, the Sub-Committee’s April 16 Report to the Advisory Committee forwarded the following language:

The State shall promote international peace and security by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments and by the maintenance of justice and the scrupulous respect for treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another.\(^\text{17}\)

This language made its way intact into the Draft Constitution prepared by Rau in October 1947. The Draft Constitution was then published in February 1948 with a view to soliciting public comment. Over the following six months the Constituent Assembly received various comments and suggestions, which were then considered by a Special Committee. At this point the language adapted from the Declaration of Havana underwent another significant alteration. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya and other delegates on the Special Committee proposed that the word “open” be deleted from the draft. This proposal attracted the ire of Rau who noted on the margin that “there is no reason why the
word ‘open’ should be deleted,” as the “article is meant, among other things, to discourage secret treaties which often lead to war.” Rau did not prevail, however. Later that month the Drafting Committee revised and restructured Article 51, effectively bringing it closer to the bulleted format utilized by the Preamble of the League of Nations. The Article now read:

The State shall:

a. promote international peace and security;

b. seek to maintain just and honourable relations between nations; and

c. endeavour to sustain respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised people with one another.19

On November 25, 1948, B. R. Ambedkar moved the assembly to amend the Draft Constitution along the lines indicated in the aforementioned list. Ambedkar informed the assembly that the language proposed by the Drafting Committee did not constitute a significant amendment; it merely “simplified” the Draft Constitution’s language by dividing it into distinct “parts.” Our foregoing discussion implies that Ambedkar’s statement was not entirely accurate, as the Drafting Committee had dropped the words “open” and “scrupulous,” not exactly minor deletions given the importance that Rau attributed to the terms (in line with the broader liberal worldview that the League of Nations’ Covenant) and in view of the emphasis that Gandhians had placed on fair play (most recently by insisting that the Union transfer to Pakistan, in spite of its intervention in Kashmir, the assets it acquired under the Partition agreement).20 At any rate, Ambedkar said little more by way of further introduction. Article 51 contained propositions “so simple,” he declared that, “it seems to be super-arrogation to try to explain them to the House by any lengthy speech.”21

The first response to Article 51 proved to be a digression, albeit an illuminating one. Complaining there was “absolutely nothing” in the Constitution that “sheds light on the fundamental principles of the Gandhian philosophy,” V. S. Sarwate demanded the insertion of a clause instructing the state to “foster truthfulness, justice, and a sense of duty in the citizens.”22 This intervention is interesting because it suggests that Sarwate did not view the Drafting Committee’s proposed language as already espousing Gandhian principles. Sarwate’s amendment was not brought to vote, though, likely because the assembly agreed with the next speaker—the Forward Bloc’s H. V. Kamath—that Article 51 concerned international relations whereas Sarwate’s proposed amendment was “something which deals with the qualities of citizens in India.”23

Kamath’s contribution was not limited to rebutting Sarwate’s proposal. He also sought to shed some light on the principles underlying Article 51. The problem confronting the wider world, Kamath explained, was that “within the last thirty years regard for international law and treaties had sunk to a low level and treaties are regarded as mere scraps of paper.”24 Fortunately, India was well placed to “bring about a vital change in international relations,” he argued, because “her ancient cultural and spiritual heritage and her tradition—centuries old tradition of non-aggression” rendered her “best qualified to enhance respect for international law and treaty obligations.”25 Article 51 furthered this salutary cause, Kamath felt, because it discouraged neglect of
international relations, making it more likely that “the world can really become one free world.”

Kamath’s remarks improved on Ambedkar’s taciturn introduction. But not everyone was satisfied with this defense of Article 51. Sarwate’s intervention might have been batted away, but others evidently shared the broader concern that insufficient regard had been shown toward Gandhian principles. The next salvo along this line came from K. T. Shah who proposed substituting the following in place of the Drafting Committee’s amendment:

The Federal Republican Secular State in India shall be pledged to maintain international peace and security and shall to that end adopt every means to promote amicable relations among nations. In particular the State in India shall endeavour to secure the fullest respect for international law and agreement between States and to maintain justice, respect for treaty rights and obligations in regard to dealings of organised peoples amongst themselves.

This language, Shah explained, was motivated by the need to foster disarmament, the surest means of achieving world peace. The problem the world faced in this regard was one of trust: “progress in an “all-around disarmament” was unlikely, Shah argued, so long as every country insisted on the other side disarmning first. Hence, the need of the hour was for “an open, frank declaration of policy, pledging a nation unreservedly to peace, to the maintenance of international law and friendship.” India ought to be the first to take this step, Shah argued, out of respect for the “teachings and the example of our great leader who made Non-violence, most clearly and unmistakably the rule of conduct, not only for individuals but also for nations.” It “behooves us who claim to be following in his footsteps,” Shah declared, “that this State at least, of which he has been proclaimed the Father, should be pledged from the outset to the maintenance of peace.”

The critical word here for Shah was “pledged.” It was not enough, he explained, to make “some vague promise” to promote international peace and security. Rather, the Indian state ought to firmly pledge itself to adopting every means possible to promoting international peace and security. Shah recognized what this language implied. Gandhi, he acknowledged, had previously stated that, “one of the first things” he would advise the Indian state to do “would be to disband the army and the police, and anything else which savoured of violence.” This advice, Shah conceded, might be too much for his countrymen to stomach, especially in the wake of Partition and Pakistan’s subsequent foray into Kashmir: “I do not know whether you would be prepared at this time, and living under the circumstances in which we are living, to carry out literally such a desire as that.” But Gandhi’s advice, he insisted, was worth taking seriously. “Unless we make a beginning, and pledge ourselves to the maintenance of peace, and to ensure security to all countries,” he argued, “we shall be making these professions sound too hollow to be believed. This was especially so, he added, in view of the emerging Cold War, where contending parties would try to “drag” India into their camp. Under the
circumstances, a preemptive declaration would help India avoid trouble: “would it not be well for us to declare that we at least from the start, shall pledge ourselves to peace that we as a people will take an oath whereby for no reason shall we resort to arms, to settle our differences with other countries, and with other peoples.”

Concerned that this argument might be viewed as too idealistic, Shah sought to bolster his case by offering a more pragmatic justification on behalf of pacifism. Suppose India sought to maintain peace in the conventional manner—that is, by “piling up armaments.” As India’s industrial base was too flimsy to manufacture such armaments, Shah noted, it would have to rely on “outside producers.” These suppliers would likely offer India older generation technology, which would not really bolster her security. Furthermore, since products of this kind tend not to be “inter-changeable,” he observed, India would be left in the position of being “completely dependent” on these “outside producers” (or forced to discard what it had purchased previously when switching suppliers). For a country that had just emerged from vassalage, Shah averred, this outcome was especially unpalatable—“continued dependence in a most vital particular upon others which we should do our best to avoid.” The “best guarantee for avoiding any complications of this kind,” he concluded, was therefore to “pledge ourselves, as a people against any form of warfare, and for ever stand to maintain and uphold peace and international security for all countries of the world including our own.”

The next speaker, Seth Damodar Swarup, one of the two Socialist Party members in the assembly, was not persuaded by either Kamath’s defense of Article 51 or by Shah’s proposed remedy. Article 51 was inadequate, Swarup maintained, because it did “not go far enough.” It ignored “some of the basic causes which generally lead to conflagration and consequent devastation and destruction of the world,” namely, the continued weakness of “oppressed and backward people,” a state of affairs that encouraged the nefarious activities of “the exploiter and the blood-sucker”—the capitalist and the imperialist—thereby “paving the way for regional and international warfare.” No less troubling, Swarup contended, was the condition of the “working class,” who were yet to “secure even the universal minimum of their social rights.” “When the workers who produce all the wealth of the world are not in a position to maintain themselves,” he observed, “it is difficult to consider who else will be able to live.” Consequently, should the Constitution fail to address itself to the “basic causes of breach of peace and security,” Swarup argued, the well-meaning sentiments expressed by Article 51 would amount to naught. His critique of the Gandhian view was clear: “unless the basic causes of breach of peace and security are removed,” he emphasized, “it will not be possible to maintain peace, national or international, by simply arriving at an understanding between nations and nations.” The need of the hour, then, was to “lay true emphasis on political and economic emancipation of the oppressed and backward classes,” and to ensure “the universal minimum to the entire working class of the world through international regulation of their legal status.” And, therefore, Swarup concluded by offering a “very innocent and harmless” amendment—the addition of the following clause:
[The State shall] also promote political and economic emancipation and cultural advancement of the oppressed and backward peoples, and the international regulation of the legal status of workers with a view to ensuring a universal minimum of social rights to the entire working class of the world.  

Swarup’s proposal elicited no reaction from the following speaker, B. H. Khardekar. Arising the day after his maiden public speech, in which he had famously questioned Article 47’s provisions in favor of prohibition, Khardekar focused on resurrecting his Gandhian credentials. Like Kamath before him, Khardekar emphasized the role India could play in shoring up international law in face of skepticism about its nature and scope: “if India were to lead the way,” he asserted, “we may have some sort of international law in spite of all the chaos that we see today.” Also like Kamath, Khardekar emphasized that India’s “spiritual heritage” made her uniquely suited to meeting this challenge:

The mission of India is the mission of peace. Right from Ram Tirth and Vivekananda down to Tagore and Gandhiji, if he has done anything, has very much strengthened it. Throughout history, it is not because we have been weak but because it has been in our blood that we have been carrying on this mission of peace. Non-violence is in the soil and in the heart of every Indian.

This theme—India’s exceptionalism—was continued by the following speaker, Biswanath Das, the former premier of Orissa, who also emphasized that India’s history and culture made her uniquely suited to promoting international peace:

India even when she was in fetters and bondage, had her mighty contribution, not in the shape of influence of prowess or wealth, but by bringing her thought into the field of international [relations] the mighty intellectual and moral influence of a Tagore and a Gandhi who taught nothing short of intentional amity, honourable and open relations between nations and countries.

Article 51, as Das saw it, stated “the limitations within which India is to play her role in international transactions.” In particular, it directed India to act in an “honest,” “upright,” and “open” manner, and to eschew “hidden” or “secret” policies. Though Das did not acknowledge or perhaps even recognize that the terms of Article 51 did not in fact impose the strict limitations that he claimed it did, he did at least acknowledge that his interpretation of Article 51 directed India to adopt a course of action quite different from that “adopted by other States.” This realization did not perturb him, though, because “under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi” India had apparently already learnt “to take to such [an] open course of action.”

Having made his plea on behalf of Gandhi, Das turned to address Swarup’s proposed amendment. Now a cautious mood took hold of him. Prime Minister Nehru’s efforts to abide by Gandhian precepts of “open relations” on the question of Kashmir had run aground at the United Nations, Das observed, because “different blocs” were actively seeking to impede India’s progress. “Muslim countries,” in particular, had
shown that they would invariably support Pakistan. Under these circumstances, he contended, Swarup’s amendment went too far (evidently these circumstances did not call into question the Gandhian precepts Das had cited moments earlier). “We are called upon to free the politically and economically exploited people of the world,” Das commented. But where, he asked, “is the necessary force to back this great programme of freeing the politically and economically exploited races of the world today in India?”

It might be, he added, that “after some time India will be their beacon light and focus attention on the exploited countries of the world”—this was certainly to be hoped for, he added—but the promised land was some distance away—“Heaven knows how long it will take for us to be able to do it. It is in the hands of God.”

Though both Khardekar and Das had spoken in favor of Article 51 on Gandhian grounds, a number of their colleagues remained dissatisfied. The following speaker, B. M. Gupta from Bombay, crystallized the lingering concern. Like Kamath and Shah before him, Gupta expressed unease about the emerging Cold War. The world, he assured his audience, was “anxious to avoid a catastrophe.” As Gandhi most clearly represented the universal human “yearning” for peace, Gupta averred, Article 51 was to be commended in so far as it made the promotion of peace, international peace and security “the cardinal principle of our foreign policy.” What was lacking, though, was a method for the promotion of peace. Notably, Gupta made no reference here to Shah’s proposal in favor unilateral disarmament and general pacifism. Instead, he championed the concept of arbitration, which could, he argued, be held out as a “substitute for war.” Article 51 would be much improved, he therefore pleaded, if it encouraged “the settlement of disputes through arbitration.”

Gupta’s request was fulfilled when the following speaker—M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar—stood up to propose that Article 51 include the following clause:

To encourage the settlement of international disputes by arbitration.

Terming Article 51 “one of the most important articles” in Part IV, Ayyangar offered a number of justifications on behalf the proposed amendment. Initially he appealed to India’s self-interest. The settlement of disputes through arbitration, Ayyangar argued, would help secure the peace and progress desired by India—a statement motivated no doubt by recent events in South Asia. Having said this, Ayyangar went on to affirm Swarup’s diagnosis that the deeper cause of international conflict was the “perpetual domination” of some countries over others. At this point, Ayyangar struck a despondent note, observing “whether we suggest resort to arbitration for the settlement of disputes or some other peaceful method, these things will continue.” What would be ideal, he ventured, would be the inclusion of a clause “that it shall be the duty and the constant endeavour of the Government of India to see that all people in the world are released from the domination of other people.” This is of course precisely what Swarup had asked for. But with his next breath Ayyangar reiterated the caution sounded by Das. “Situated as we are,” Ayyangar noted, “we cannot do it,” namely, make a concerted effort to secure the freedom of dominated peoples. Hence, for the foreseeable future, he concluded, India would have to rely on arbitration as “the sole means of settling international disputes.”
Ayyangar’s argument, which depicted arbitration somewhat uninspiringly as the weapon of the physically weak rather than the morally strong, provided an opening for the razor-sharp tongue of Mahavir Tyagi, the final, and most interesting, participant in the debate. According to Tyagi, Article 51 did not “add any substance to the Constitution.”

It represented no more than a “pious wish” (a biting phrase that had gained traction during recent debates on the various Directive Principles). Ayyangar’s amendment was particularly ill-advised, he thought, because in the arena of international affairs it was “very difficult to get honest arbitrators” (a reference, no doubt, to India’s recent unpleasant experience at the United Nations over the issue of Kashmir).

Indeed, how could “anybody arbitrate in such matters” Tyagi asked, when powerful nations would not accept an unfavorable outcome? This was why talk of international arbitration, he observed, was invariably followed by the use of “guns and aeroplanes.”

Having made quick work of Ayyangar’s and Gupta’s view, Tyagi then took on Shah’s call for disarmament. Since the powerful were not likely to submit to international arbitration, India must, he emphasized, make preparations for war, no matter how pure her motives. Being willing to fight, the former British Army officer informed his audience, could readily prove “a blessing.” As he put it:

If these are our objectives, if we want to maintain peace and seek to maintain just and honourable relations between nations, then I say it is not possible if we remain weak and remain merely a meadow of green grass for bulls to come and graze freely. For the purposes mentioned in this clause what we want is armament, both of will and weapons, moral armament as well as physical armament. We should see to it that our nation is militarily strong. We should see to it that our army, our navy and air force remain strong. That should be the directive that we should give to our future government of India if only to achieve our laudable objective of “world peace.” As it is, we are a pygmy in the world. Who cares for you unless you are strong? Unless your argument has guns behind it, nobody would appreciate your arguments. Our present position is weak. I do not say that we are weak against any of our immediate neighbours but to count in the international field, we should be a first-class power. Our aim should be to become a first-class power, a strong power, so that our voice, our pleadings and our arguments may have some weight and people may know that they should not annoy this great country and that would mean a war. So, Sir, I want to reserve one privilege as a man of war, that in case we fail to achieve these objects peacefully, we shall war and accomplish these objects.

Tyagi’s strident remarks did not lead to a broader debate, much less provoke a reconsideration of Article 51. Indeed his remarks were not intended to do so, as Tyagi himself indicated that—his reservations notwithstanding—he would vote in favor of Article 51. The amendments proposed by Shah or Swarup fared no better; they failed to win the assembly’s support. The only substantive amendment that was accepted by Ambedkar, and by the assembly, was the one proposed by Gupta and Ayyangar, who requested the inclusion of the clause directing the State to “encourage the settlement of international disputes by arbitration.” Presumably this insertion explains why Prasad’s closing remarks in November 1949 cited Article 51 as a testament to Gandhian values.
The Commonwealth Debate

The debate over Article 51 is striking for two reasons. To begin with, it reveals the clouding effect that Gandhian rhetoric had on the Indian mind. Consider, for instance, the sentiment, expressed frequently during the proceedings that India’s “heritage” made her exceptionally qualified to promote international peace. The progenitor of this view—as Khardekar rightly observed—was Swami Vivekananda. According to Vivekananda, peace would only be realized if nations learnt to overcome the materialism that led to the rise and inevitable decay of empires. Hinduism, he argued, embodied this knowledge—this was in fact the reason India had never sought to conquer. As a consequence, it became India’s duty, Vivekananda argued, to spread Hindu philosophy. “The foundation of her being, the raison d’être of her very existence,” he wrote in ‘India’s Message to the World,’ was “the spiritualisation of the human race.”

Gandhi picked up this thread even before he returned to India—it made an early appearance in Hind Swaraj—and proceeded to complete the transformation initiated by Vivekananda. The Constituent Assembly Debates show how far Gandhi succeeded. We find no mention in the proceedings of the raj dharma tradition embodied in classical treatises like Manusmriti and Agni Purana, in classical compilations such as Arthashastra and Nitisara, and classical literary works like Hitopadesha and Mahabharata. This is a significant omission when one compares, for instance, Vivekananda’s and subsequently Gandhi’s praise of the “mild Hindu” with Bhishma’s declaration in Book twelve of the Mahabharata that “the king that is mild is regarded as the worst of his kind” and is so utterly “disregarded by everyone” that not unlike how a snake swallows up mice, the Earth tends to swallow up “the king who is averse to battle.” Hence, “be thy preceptor or be thy friend,” Bhishma warns rulers, “he that acts inimically towards thy kingdom... should be slain.”

It is worth emphasizing here that these classical treatises were hardly obscure. The relevant texts had been translated and published widely since the latter half of the nineteenth century, with key excerpts being incorporated into Swami Dayanand Saraswati’s widely read Satyarth Prakash. The doctrines in question had also been frequently referenced by an earlier generation of Congress leaders—Lala Lajpat Rai and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, in particular. Still, these ideas appear to have been largely ignored by the Constituent Assembly during the discussion of Article 51.

Also absent from the discussion was any reference to the militant ideals espoused by writers like Bankim Chandra and Aurobindo Ghosh. Consider, for example, Bankim’s remarkable essay, Dharmaatattva. The dialogue addresses the question: what constitutes happiness? Its answer: reflection and devotion (bhakti) constitute the only durable form of happiness. But bhakti, the dialogue goes on teach, cannot be pursued in the absence of a strong state and a patriotic populace capable of robust, militant responses, because a “strong people is always ready to fall upon the weaker ones.” Hence, even those who wish to devote themselves to nothing more than bhakti, the dialogue concludes, must always be prepared to forcefully resist foreign aggression.

The debate over Article 51 is striking, then, because it reveals how deeply Gandhian ideals had influenced public discourse in the decades preceding Independence. This is not the only reason it is striking, though. The debate on Article 51 also reveals that the Gandhian ideals in question were not universally admired. This is not a reference to the
family disagreement between Shah and Gupta, with the former equating Gandhianism with disarmament, the latter with arbitration. The reference is to Tyagi’s critique of Article 51. The significance of Tyagi’s critique might be questioned since his appears to be a lonely voice. There are, however, two reasons to be cautious in reaching this conclusion. To begin with, others who were skeptical of Gandhian ideals may have held their fire during the debate on Article 51, comforted by the knowledge that the Directive Principles of State Policy were non-binding—a “veritable dustbin of sentiments,” as T.T. Krishnamachari memorably put it. In other words, the debate over Article 51 may present a less-than-complete reckoning of how delegates thought India should conduct itself, because the stakes were not sufficiently high to spur interventions on the subject.

Furthermore, the debate in question occurred ten months after Gandhi’s assassination. The move by those who defended Article 51 to evoke his memory may have also promoted deference from those who shared Tyagi’s view. Tyagi, we can be fairly confident, was not alone in his distaste for the pieties expresses in Article 51. How can we say this? A fuller sense of the delegates’ thinking can be discerned by examining the extensive debate that occurred when the assembly was asked to ratify India’s membership in the Commonwealth of Nations. This debate reveals that there were in fact many who, like Tyagi, were skeptical of the means, and perhaps even the ends, articulated in Article 51.

On May 16–17, 1949, the Constituent Assembly considered ratifying Prime Minister Nehru’s declaration at the conclusion of the Conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers that India would continue to be a member of the Commonwealth. The debate proved acrimonious. It featured attacks on the intelligence and capability of the Prime Minister, and also sharp questions about the scope of the assembly’s authority. This is not the place to examine the validity of these objections. We need focus only on the exchanges over the merits of participating in the Commonwealth, which reveal wide disagreement over principles that the assembly had previously enshrined in Article 51.

In defending the Commonwealth declaration, Nehru needed to reconcile two principles that appeared to be pulling in different directions. The first principle was pacifism or nonviolence. India—or to be precise, the Congress Party—had long been committed to promoting the Gandhian ideal of nonviolence. “I think it is and it ought to be our policy,” Nehru told the assembly, “to strive to overcome the general trend towards war in people’s minds.” This was to be done, he argued, by “laying stress on those qualities of those countries which are good, which are acceptable and drawing out the best from them and thereby, in so far as it may be possible, to work to lessen the tensions and work for peace.”

India was “partly suited” to use this “psychological” approach, Nehru averred, because “in spite of our being feeble and rather unworthy followers of Gandhiji, nevertheless we have imbibed to some small extent what he told us.” The second principle was autonomy. India desired, in the words of a prominent Congress Party resolution, “to maintain all such links with other countries as do not come in the way of her freedom of action and independence.”

Nehru’s critics, who included Shibban Lal Saxena, H. V. Kamath, Seth Govind Das, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, and K. T. Shah argued that India’s membership in the Commonwealth brought these principles into question because it meant associating
with England, which was becoming ever more deeply involved in the fight against
the spread of communism in Asia, and with South Africa and Australia, which had
long practiced racial discrimination against Indian subjects. As such, involvement in
the Commonwealth implied, they argued, that India was effectively taking sides in the
Cold War, and undermining key “pillars” of her foreign policy, namely, to fight “against
racial discrimination” and “for the freedom of suppressed nationalities.” Nehru’s pol-
cy, they therefore concluded, was misguided in that it sacrificed India’s autonomy for
the sake of an unprofitable engagement, one that would draw the country into conflict
rather than advance world peace. The radical socialist leader Mohani expressed most
memorably the puzzlement that Nehru’s critics from the Left felt. “When a policy of
ours is appreciated by people like Mr. Churchill,” Mohani warned his fellow delegates,
“we need no more proof to declare that the whole thing is absurd.”

Nehru’s response to these criticisms presaged the line of argumentation he was to
refine over the coming decade. He started by emphasizing that—on balance—it was
better to associate with countries, even if one disagreed with them, because engage-
ment opened the door to dialogue: “where we are often at the verge of war, I think it
is not a safe thing to encourage to break up any association that one has.” It was also
important to refrain from self-righteous criticism of others, he argued, because such
an approach would only engender negativity. As such, the Commonwealth declaration
was in keeping with Gandhian principles, because it sought what was advantageous
not only for India but also for England, thereby increasing “goodwill” and avoid-
ing the destructive cycle of exploitation and recrimination that typically characterized
international relations. At the same time Nehru emphasized that membership in the
Commonwealth would not limit India’s freedom of maneuver. India would remain
free to criticize, and indeed to depart from the Commonwealth, should circumstances
demand it. In short, Nehru attempted to portray the Commonwealth declaration as
furthering the search for peace without sacrificing India’s newly gained independence.

Now that background has been discussed, what is interesting to note in the debate
on the Commonwealth declaration is not the exchange between Nehru and his critics
from the Left, but rather the remarks made by those who rose to defend Nehru’s policy.
These supposedly friendly remarks disclose views regarding the nature of international
relations that differed markedly from those expressed by the Prime Minister—views
more in keeping with the skepticism expressed by Tyagi. Nehru himself acknowledged
this discordance. As he informed the assembly prior to the final vote, some of those who
had spoken in approval of his Commonwealth declaration had “gone a little further
than I might perhaps have gone. They have drawn some consequences and pointed out
some implications which for my part I would not have approved or accepted.”

What were the “implications” that Nehru disavowed? The first implication was that
even though India ought to strive to maintain peace between the West and the Soviet
Union, in the event of a confrontation, India would—or at least ought to—side with
Western liberal democracies. No small number of speakers that rose to support India’s
continued membership in the Commonwealth stressed this point—the list includes
M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, Seth Govind Das, Thakur Das Bhargava, Pandit
Balkrishna Sharma, Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru, K.M. Munshi, Alladi Krishnaswami
Ayyar, Kameshwar Singh, Begum Aizaz Rasul, and Frank Anthony. An early salvo on this front came from Pandit Sharma, who declared:

if I were convinced that our going Red will be in the best interest of the country and of humanity at large, I will be the first man to raise my hand in favour of our going Red. But, unfortunately, from what we have read of the foreign policy as also of the internal policy of Russia we are convinced that it is not ultimately in the interests either of the down-trodden or of the world at large. Why? . . . [Because] it is anti-social, because before the Ogre of the State the individual is being sacrificed every minute of his existence.\textsuperscript{86}

The point was subsequently put even more directly by that remarkable personality from the Muslim League, Begum Rasul:

We cannot also forget that Indian ideology is opposed to communism. There is no doubt that we do not want communism in our country, and we know that Britain and the countries of the Commonwealth are also opposed to communism. Therefore, that is also a common factor between the two.\textsuperscript{87}

A second implication followed from the first. If the political differences confronting the world were such that neither neutrality nor nonalignment, and certainly not arbitration, could necessarily ensure peace, then India had to be prepared to obtain peace through power. But on this front, Pandit Kunzru pointed out, there was much still to be done. “I think there can be no greater mistake than imagining that because our status is equal to that of any other nation, our stature, our political position in the world is also equal to that of the bigger and more advanced nations,” he warned the assembly.\textsuperscript{88} The remedy for this deficiency, Munshi subsequently underscored, was not easily within India’s reach. “It is very easy to talk about world peace,” he noted, and to praise “collective security.” But collective security, he underscored, “is not a mantra to charm serpents with . . . It really implies preparation, defensive preparations, standardisation of weapons, co-ordinated research and planning and industrial co-operation between nations on a very large scale.”\textsuperscript{89} What India’s circumstances really demanded, then, speakers like Ayyar and Singh went on to stress, was a willingness to enter into profitable relationships such as that offered by membership in the Commonwealth:

Both history and geography entitle [India] to ensure the peace of the world. But she can discharge that function only if she is strong both militarily and economically. She can be made so by the co-operation of the Commonwealth countries and America. She can be made so by the better alliance could be possible to stem the tide of unrest which is surging in all parts of the world and threatening the fundamental principles of human liberty with extinction.\textsuperscript{90}

If this medicine—allying with distasteful but nonetheless potentially useful partners such as South Africa and Australia—was much too bitter, Frank Anthony added,
then the answer lay not in isolation and withdrawal (as Kamath and Mohani had proposed) but instead to build up India’s strength so that she could realize and enforce her preferred policies:

our policy must be broad-based, and that India’s strength should be built up most rapidly. It may take us five years; it may take us ten years. But any realist, any sober person must realise that in the world we are living in today, in the final analysis, one’s strength is measured exactly by one’s military might . . . 91

Or as Ayyar put it:

until you develop your own strength you will be subject to control by other nations. Therefore, the only way in which to approach the problem is to see that there is nothing in the way of developing our strength . . . 92

Conclusion
This essay has questioned the widely held beliefs that (1) the strategic worldview of India’s political elite has developed in linear fashion, with realism having attracted adherents only recently; and (2) that calls for realism in international politics originated outside the Congress Party, principally with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). To this end this essay has presented historical evidence showing that realism had its votaries from the very start, and that many of these votaries were members of the Congress, who had little or nothing to do with Hindu nationalism.

Given limitations of space, we have presented a relatively narrow slice of history, focusing solely on the Constituent Assembly Debates. We have not discussed additional archival materials such as popular political tracts dating back to the early nineteenth century. Such evidence would only bolster our claim that the critical voices heard during the Constituent Assembly Debates were neither new nor unusual; in fact they inherited and represented pragmatic outlook that had found support in India from the mid nineteenth century onward. That being said, the centrality of the evidence presented here is surely beyond question: the Constituent Assembly was the venue at which the leading figures of the day met to debate and carve out a future for their country.

We must emphasize that we do not question here Nehru’s influence on the actual conduct of foreign policy. Nehru had a profound impact on foreign policy in the decades following Independence, not least because of his hands were on the levers of power.93 The limited point being made here is that Nehru’s ideas were not universally admired—indeed not even within the Congress Party. The debates we have highlighted show that even at Independence thinking about strategic matters was in fact diverse, factious even.94 Though Nehru’s dominant position meant that these critical voices had limited effect on the wording of the Constitution, and even lesser effect on the conduct of policy, they should be acknowledged, not least because they reveal that the realism that has seeped into contemporary discussions is not a radical or unprecedented development but rather the fruition of a long-standing critique.
We hope that the evidence we have uncovered and discussed herein will prompt further historical research in this direction and thereby help correct the myths that have grown up around the evolution of the strategic worldview of India’s political elites.

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NOTES


2. Cohen, India, 43.


8. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1999), Ch. 1. Given the Congress Party’s dominance, it is perhaps not surprising that the most important Hindutva critiques of Nehruvian foreign policy emerged outside the assembly, most notably in the writings of V.D. Savarkar and M.S. Golwalkar. On this see Rahul Sagar, “The Hindu Nationalist View of International Politics” in India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases, ed. Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, and V. Krishnappa (New Delhi, India: Routledge, 2014), 234–257.


14. Rau, “Notes on Fundamental Rights,” 34. Rau’s claim was empirically well founded. As Durga Das Basu’s famous Commentary on the Constitution of India notes, a number of other constitutions including those of Ireland, France, and Japan contained similar exhortatory language (Commentary on the Constitution of India, Calcutta, India: Sarkar, 1956, 4). Also see Markandan, Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution, 267–68. It is not the case, however, as Cathal O’Normain seems to imply, that Article 51 was inspired by Article 29 of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland (“The Influence of Irish Political Thought on the Indian Constitution,” The Indian Year Book of International Affairs 1 (1952): 157).

93. Ganguly and Pardesi, “Explaining Sixty Years of India’s Foreign Policy,” 5.